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BIPA: WHAT DOES IT STAND FOR?
PAIGE SMITH
INTRODUCTION
The year is 2018. Social media is abuzz with screenshots from a
trendy new app by Google, called Google Arts & Culture. The app experienced rapid popularity when it introduced a new feature, which allowed its
users to submit a photo of themselves in order to discover what piece of art
from the collection of museums on Google Arts & Culture most resembles
the user. 1 Amidst the worldwide internet excitement the app created, Illinois users had a different experience. When an Illinois user would download the app, the user would not be offered the option to utilize this
feature. 2
The reason behind the absence of this app’s presence in Illinois stems
from an abundance of caution by Google, which resulted from what has
been deemed “one of the strictest laws of its kind in the nation.”3 Though it
is unsettled whether Google’s app would violate Illinois’s strict data privacy laws, Google opted to avoid the Illinois market completely. 4
In the early 2000’s, a company called Pay By Touch promised to revolutionize the way the world pays by using a biometric authentication system. 5 This system linked users’ fingerprints to credit cards, checking
accounts, loyalty programs, and other accounts, allowing users to pay with
the touch of their finger rather than the swipe of their credit card.6 Pay By
Touch had amassed thousands of users as the largest fingerprint scan sys1. Michelle Luo, Exploring Art (through selfies) with Google Arts & Culture, THE KEYWORD
(Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.blog.google/outreach-initiatives/arts-culture/exploring-art-through-selfiesgoogle-arts-culture/ [https://perma.cc/ANN4-4CKN].
2. Ally Marotti, Google’s Art Selfies Aren’t Available in Illinois. Here’s Why., CHI. TRIB. (Jan.
17, 2018), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-google-art-selfies-20180116-story.html?
[https://perma.cc/S55U-6HF6].
3. Ally Marotti, Proposed Changes to Illinois’ Biometric Law Concern Privacy Advocates, CHI.
TRIB. (Apr. 10, 2018), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-illinois-biometrics-bills20180409-story.html# [https://perma.cc/G5YX-NCUZ].
4. Marotti, supra note 2.
5. Erica Gunderson, Are We Safer in Illinois, Or Just Having Less Fun?, WTTW (Jan. 22,
2018), https://news.wttw.com/2018/01/22/biometric-data-are-we-safer-illinois-or-just-having-less-fun
[https://perma.cc/QS4H-D4FY].
6. Id.
833
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tem in Illinois, with their program used in grocery stores, gas stations, and
cafeterias.7 In 2007, Pay By Touch began bankruptcy proceedings. 8 The
Illinois legislature reacted to the bankruptcy proceedings by enacting the
Biometric Information Privacy Act in 2008, in an effort to prevent Pay By
Touch from selling the fingerprints of its users as an asset in its bankruptcy
proceedings. 9
In considering whether Google’s app would have violated Illinois’s
strict privacy laws, one must examine Google’s main cause for concern, the
Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”). BIPA contains protections to
prevent misuse of biometric data through regulation of the “collection, use,
safeguarding, handling, storage, retention, and destruction of biometric
identifiers and information.” 10 BIPA defines “biometric identifier” as “a
retina or iris scan, fingerprint, voiceprint, or scan of hand or face geometry.” 11 The statute defines “biometric information” as “any information,
regardless of how it is captured, converted, stored, or shared, based on an
individual’s biometric identifier used to identify an individual.” 12
Google, in a message to users on the app, said that the app works by
allowing the user to take a photo of his or her face, which is then sent to
Google and stored for the amount of time it takes to analyze and find an
artwork that matches the user.13 Once the user submits the photo, Google
uses facial recognition software to detect the face within the image and
subsequently create a faceprint of unique characteristics to compare against
information in its database. 14 As Google is using the image of the user to
create a scan of face geometry and subsequently storing the information for
any period of time, Google’s actions would likely fall under the purview of
BIPA. As such, were Google to implement this feature in Illinois, BIPA

7. Charles N. Insler, Understanding the Biometric Information Privacy Act Litigation Explosion,
106 ILL. B.J. 34, 35
(2018).
8. Jon Van & Becky Yerak, Payment By Fingerprint Disappears, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 21, 2008),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2008-03-21-0803200909-story.html.
9. Id.
10. Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5 (2008)
11. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/10
12. Id.
13. Aaron Young, How Google’s Art App Matches Your Face With a Famous Painting (and Why
MOINES
REGISTER
(Jan.
16,
2018),
Everyone’s
Obsessed
With
It),
DES
https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/tech/2018/01/16/google-arts-culture-app-selfie-famouspainting-iphone-android/1035861001/ [https://perma.cc/V7KT-ZCJX].
14. Eileen Guo, How Google Arts and Culture’s Face Match A.I. Actually Works, INVERSE (Jan.
14,
2018),
https://www.inverse.com/article/40177-google-arts-and-culture-technology
[https://perma.cc/D95Y-5TS4].

2020]

BIPA

835

would require that Google take certain steps to protect Illinois users’ data
privacy.
First, BIPA prohibits companies from “collect[ing], captur[ing], purchas[ing], receiv[ing] through trade, or otherwise obtain[ing]” a person’s
biometric data without first informing the subject of both: (1) the collection
or storage itself, as well as the specific purpose and length of term of the
collection or storage and (2) obtaining written consent for the collection or
storage. 15 In addition, BIPA mandates that a company in possession of
biometric identifiers or information develop and disseminate a written policy that details both a retention schedule and guidelines for permanent destruction of the data. 16 A company must destroy data “when the initial
purpose for collecting or obtaining such identifiers or information has been
satisfied or within [three] years of the individual’s last interaction with the
private entity, whichever occurs first.” 17 As such, in order to comply with
BIPA, Google would be required to provide Illinois users with a notification containing the above information regarding collection, storage, retention, and destruction of their biometric data, as well as obtain their written
permission for such storage.
Next, in order to safeguard biometric information, BIPA prohibits
companies from selling, leasing, trading, or otherwise profiting from collected biometric data or disseminating this data without the express consent
of the user. 18 Thus, Google would be prohibited under BIPA from disseminating Illinois user data to any third party without prior written consent.
BIPA requires that private entities use a “reasonable standard of care”
to protect biometric data in a manner that is the same or more protective
than the manner in which they store other confidential and sensitive information.19 Should a company breach the statute, BIPA provides a right of
action to “any person aggrieved by a violation of this act,” from which the
aggrieved party may recover statutory liquidated damages in the amount of
$1,000 or actual damages, whichever is greater, for each violation of the
statute. 20 Therefore, were Google to implement this feature in Illinois, it
could potentially open itself up to private actions brought under BIPA
should it violate any of the above requirements, which could cost the company significant legal fees.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(b).
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(a).
Id.
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(c)–(d).
740 ILL. COMP. STAT.14/15(e).
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/20.
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However, current caselaw leaves questions remaining as to what types
of violations of BIPA may lead to a judgment against the company. Class
action litigation brought under BIPA has exploded in recent years, centering initially around the hotly contested definition of “person aggrieved.” 21
The arguments in favor of dismissal suggest that a violation of BIPA without any further measurable “harm” to the plaintiff is insufficient to confer
standing, constitutional or statutory, and therefore, the actions must be
dismissed.
Section I of this note will discuss the issues raised by current caselaw
interpreting BIPA litigation, specifically addressing both procedural standing and how courts have interpreted the language “person aggrieved” in the
context of statutory standing. Section I will also review the current disputes
facing BIPA litigation today. Finally, Section II will consider the future of
judicial interpretation of BIPA, arguing that BIPA’s stated intent to protect
data misuse should lead to broad judicial interpretations of the statute such
that it avoids interpretations inconsistent with the purpose of the legislation.
I. BIPA LITIGATION AT THE MOTION TO DISMISS STAGE
From its inception in 2008, BIPA existed without litigation until 2015,
when Judge Norgle, in Norberg v. Shutterfly, stated that, to that date, he
was “unaware of any judicial interpretation of the statute.” 22 Following
Shutterfly, a flurry of class action complaints was filed, which have raised a
multitude of issues in the judicial statutory interpretation of BIPA. Many
defendants’ motions to dismiss challenged standing as a threshold issue,
under both procedural and statutory standing theories.
Both federal 23 and state 24 courts have heard BIPA claims, with most
claims being litigated in federal courts largely the result of removal by
defendants. 25 While federal courts are able to interpret Illinois law, deci21. IL Supreme Court decides to take up Six Flags fingerprint privacy case; spurs fresh rise in
BIPA lawsuits, COOK COUNTY REC. (Jun. 29, 2018), https://cookcountyrecord.com/stories/511470207il-supreme-court-decides-to-take-up-six-flags-fingerprint-privacy-case-spurs-fresh-rise-in-bipa-lawsuits
[https://perma.cc/SN62-YV3F].
22. 152 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1106 (N.D. Ill. 2015); see King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America, 333 U.S. 153 (1948).
23. See McCollough v. Smarte Carte, Inc. No. 16 C 03777, 2016 WL 4077108 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1,
2016); Dixon v. Washington & Jane Smith Cmty.—Beverly, No. 17 C 8033, 2018 WL 2445292 (N.D.
Ill. May 31, 2018).
24. See Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 129 N.E.3d 1197 (Ill. 2019);; Sekura v. Krishna
Schaumburg Tan Inc., 115 N.E.3d 1080 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018).
25. Goings v. UGN, Inc., No. 17-cv-9340, 2018 WL 2966970, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 13, 2018);
Howe v. Speedway LLC, No. 17-cv-07303, 2018 WL 2445541, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 31, 2018); Peatry
v. Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 3d 766, 767 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 2019).
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sions made in federal courts are not binding on state courts, and decisions
made by state courts are not binding upon federal courts. 26 Decisions made
by either respective court may be used as persuasive authority, but federal
and state courts are not bound to follow the other’s decisions, especially
where the decisions are made at the trial court level. 27 However, since the
majority of the BIPA cases currently in federal court are the result of removal, the Erie doctrine commands federal courts use Illinois law to analyze substantive legal claims, but it allows them to use federal law to
analyze procedural issues, including standing. 28 Thus, when analyzing the
procedural issue of standing, a federal court will apply federal law.
A. BIPA Plaintiffs Satisfy Federal Procedural Standing
Procedural standing in federal court will necessarily breed caselaw
distinctive from state court, as standing, a threshold requirement for federal
litigation, is governed by Article III of the United States Constitution. 29
Article III standing requires “[t]he plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury-in-fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial
decision.” 30 Federal caselaw development of BIPA’s federal standing jurisprudence begins with Spokeo v. Robins. 31 In Spokeo, the plaintiff, Robins,
alleged a violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) against the
defendant, Spokeo, a company that operates a “people search engine.”32 In
order to perform a search with Spokeo, an individual inputs a person’s
name, phone number, or email address, and Spokeo searches multiple databases to provide information on the subject of the search.33 Robins was the
subject of such a search. 34 Spokeo’s search of Robins returned incorrect
information about Robins, which was later disseminated. 35 Robins filed a
complaint on his own behalf and on behalf of a class of similarly situated
individuals alleging that Spokeo failed to comply with the statutory provisions of the FCRA.36
26. See King, 333 U.S. at 153; People v. Williams, 641 N.E.2d 296 (Ill. 1994).
27. See King, 333 U.S. at 153.
28. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
29. Spokeo v. Robins, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1545 (2016).
30. Id. at 1547.
31. Id. at 1545.
32. Id. at 1547.
33. Id. at 1544.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1544-46.
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The district court granted Spokeo’s motion to dismiss on the grounds
that Robins’s complaint had not properly pled an injury-in-fact, as required
by Article III standing. 37 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision, finding that “the violation of a statutory
right is usually a sufficient injury-in-fact to confer standing.” 38 The Ninth
Circuit held that the key issue to enable recovery under the act was that
Spokeo violated Robins’s personal statutory rights, not just the statutory
rights of others. 39
The Supreme Court reversed the finding of the Ninth Circuit.40 The
Court, in examining Article III standing, looked particularly at the “injuryin-fact” requirement.41 In order to establish injury-in-fact, the Court requires a plaintiff to show that he or she “suffered ‘an invasion of a legally
protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’”42 Particularization must affect the
plaintiff in an individual or personal way and is necessary, but not sufficient, to establish standing. 43 The injury must also be “concrete.” 44 The
Court held that, though the injury may be an intangible harm created by the
legislature, congressional grant of a statutory right and private right of action does not automatically satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement. 45 The
Court also stated that risk of real harm could satisfy concreteness.46 However, the situation in the present case may not have presented the risk for
real harm, as the Court had trouble imagining that dissemination of incorrect information, such as a zip code, introduces the risk of concrete harm. 47
Regardless, the Court ultimately did not make a finding as to whether Robins satisfied the injury-in-fact requirement, finding instead that the Ninth
Circuit had not appropriately analyzed injury-in-fact by failing to distinguish concreteness from particularization.48 As such, the Court remanded
the case for proceedings consistent with their opinion. 49

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 1546.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 1550.
Id. at 1547-48.
Id. at 1548.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 1549.
Id.
See id. at 1550.
Id.
Id.
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Despite the fact that Spokeo pertains to a statutory violation of the
FCRA, its standing analysis is still applicable to BIPA. Its applicability is
readily apparent from the analogies between statutes. The FCRA also contains a provision that allows for civil liability brought by individual private
actions requesting statutory damages in cases of noncompliance. 50 That
similarity has implications for how BIPA’s provision is interpreted.
Spokeo’s reasoning has clearly influenced other federal courts in dismissing
BIPA cases based on lack of Article III standing.
For example, in McCollough v. Smarte Carte, Inc., the plaintiff,
McCollough, brought a class action lawsuit against the defendant, Smarte
Carte, a company that owns and operates electronic lockers and other services for use in public places for a fee.51 In order to operate the lockers, the
renter’s fingerprint is used as a key. 52 McCollough alleged that she used
Smarte Carte’s lockers five times in 2015, using her fingerprint each
time. 53 McCollough alleged that Smarte Carte violated BIPA by retaining
her fingerprint data without McCollough’s written consent. 54 McCollough
further alleged that Smarte Carte did not publicly disclose its retention
schedule nor did it disclose the purpose and length of time for which the
fingerprint data would be collected, stored, and used, also in violation of
BIPA. 55 Smarte Carte brought a motion to dismiss based on lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, arguing that McCollough did not allege an injury to
satisfy Article III standing. 56
The court in McCollough, following the reasoning of the Court in
Spokeo, found for Smarte Carte. 57 The court reasoned that, to satisfy the
injury-in-fact requirement, McCollough must allege an injury that is concrete and particularized. The court relied on previous Supreme Court precedent to stating that “deprivation of a procedural right without some
concrete interest that is affected by the deprivation . . . is insufficient to
create Article III standing.” 58 The court found that McCollough had not
alleged that harm resulted from Smarte Carte’s alleged BIPA violation. 59
The court held that McCollough did not have standing under Article III, as
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

15 U.S.C. § 1681n (1970).
McCollough v. Smarte Carte, Inc., No. 16 C 03777, 2016 WL 4077108 at *1 (N.D. Ill. 2016).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *3-4
See id. at *5-6.
Id. at *3 (quoting Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U.S. 488, 496 (2009)).
Id. at *3.
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her allegation of a violation of BIPA did not satisfy the concrete injury
requirement under Article III. 60
McCollough, and other federal cases with similar findings, do not
properly interpret the holding of Spokeo. The McCollough court cites to
Supreme Court authority to support their holding that a bare violation of
the statute is insufficient to create Article III standing. Spokeo, however,
does not contain such a narrow holding. Rather, Spokeo leaves open the
possibility of a violation of a statutory right to satisfy concreteness, and,
thus, the requirement of standing, should the risk of real harm exist. 61
Spokeo’s specific holding instead prohibits a de facto injury flowing from a
bare procedural violation of a statute. This holding begs the question—of
what does a procedural violation consist?
Subsequent post-Spokeo caselaw has begun interpreting the distinction
between procedural and substantive violations, including in the BIPA context. In Bautz v. ARS Nat’l Servs., the trial court found standing in an action
alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”)
and requesting relief in the form of statutory damages. In finding that
Bautz’s allegation of a violation of the FDCPA was sufficient to satisfy
concreteness, the court noted that “[c]ongress has the authority to create
new legal interests by statute, the invasion of which can support standing.” 62 As such, the court, citing Supreme Court precedent, held that a violation can rise to the level of a substantive violation where historical
practice and congressional judgment support finding a substantive right. 63
In Bautz, the court found that, as Congress enacted the FDCPA to remedy
the precise conduct alleged in the action, the violation should be considered
a substantive violation and is a de facto injury, satisfying the concreteness
requirement.64 As the FDCPA provides for a private right of action and
relief in the form of statutory damages upon violation, it is analogous to
BIPA and relevant in guiding courts’ interpretation of injury-in-fact for
BIPA cases. 65
Other caselaw has supported this view and provided additional guidance in distinguishing between the violation types. In Aranda v. Caribbean
Cruise Lines, a case finding standing for an action alleging a violation of
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) and requesting statutory
60. Id. at *4.
61. Spokeo v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016).
62. Bautz v. ARS Nat’l Servs., 226 F. Supp. 3d 131, 138 (E.D. N.Y. 2016) (citing Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975)).
63. Id. at 141 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992)).
64. Id. at 147.
65. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k (1977).

2020]

BIPA

841

damages, the court made a differentiation between substantive and procedural violations. 66 The court compared the two types of violations, explaining: “[i]n contrast to statutes that impose obligations regarding how one
manages data, keeps records, or verifies information, . . . the TCPA directly
prohibits a person from taking actions directed at consumers, who will be
actively touched by that person’s conduct.” 67 The Aranda court ultimately
held that the TCPA violation was a substantive violation.68 As such, the
statutory violation was sufficient to warrant a concrete injury, which was
ultimately essential in the court’s finding that the plaintiff satisfied the
injury-in-fact requirement without an allegation of any greater harm beyond statutory noncompliance. 69
Aranda’s substantive violation framework is similarly applicable to
BIPA. To begin, both BIPA and the TCPA are statutorily analogous, in that
they both allow for a private right of action requesting statutory damages in
the event of statutory noncompliance. 70 In Aranda, the court differentiates
substantive violations from procedural violations based on whether the
statute dictates the direct action defendants must take beyond simple record
keeping. 71 Under Aranda, it could be easily argued that BIPA is merely
procedural because of the fact that it deals solely with data and could be
characterized as a statute that seemingly only regulates how private entities
should handle biometric data.72 However, BIPA goes beyond regulating
how companies manage biometric data: it requires private entities to take
affirmative steps to provide notice and collect consent prior to the collection, use, storage, or dissemination of someone’s biometric data. 73 Just like
TCPA “prohibits certain kind of telephonic contact with consumers without
first obtaining their consent,” 74 BIPA requires private entities to take direct
action in the form of notion and collection of consent prior to collecting,
using, storing, or disseminating biometric data.75 As such, a BIPA violation
should be considered to affect a plaintiff’s substantive rights, such that a
plaintiff should be able to establish concreteness.

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

202 F. Supp. 3d 850, 857 (N.D. Ill. 2016).
Id. at 858.
Id. at 858.
Id.
47 U.S.C § 227(b)(3) (1991).
202 F. Supp. 3d at 858.
See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§14/1–14/99 (2019).
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 14/15(b)–(d) (2019).
Aranda, 202 F. Supp. 3d at 857.
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 14/15(b)–(d) (2019).
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Were the Aranda court to find that a violation of the TCPA should instead be categorized as a procedural violation, however, it would not automatically be the case that the allegation of a statutory violation without
further harm is insufficient to satisfy the concrete requirement and, ultimately, the injury-in-fact requirement. Instead, it must undergo a unique
analysis separate from violations deemed substantive. 76 In Strubel v.
Comenity Bank, a case finding standing in an action alleging violations of
the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), the court held that Spokeo should not
be considered to bar all violations of statutorily mandated procedures from
satisfying injury-in-fact.77 In analyzing whether the violation was sufficient
to satisfy concreteness, the court formulated a test for analyzing procedural
violations. 78 The court held that the critical inquiry was whether the procedural violation presented a “risk of real harm” to a concrete interest.79 Determining that Comenity Bank’s actions gave rise to a risk of real harm to
the consumer’s concrete interest in the informed use of credit, the court
held that Strubel did not have to allege additional harm to satisfy concrete
injury requirement.80 This case is again instructive in BIPA inquiries because TILA is an analogous statute in that it also provides for a private
right of action with relief in the form of statutory damages upon noncompliance with the statutory provisions. 81
Thus, the McCollough court was incorrect in its interpretation of
Spokeo. Again, its interpreted holding of Spokeo was far too broad. While
the above cases are persuasive authority to the McCollough court, they
illustrate that the language of Spokeo very clearly states that only bare procedural violations are insufficient without a risk of real harm. Thus, given
the guidance from the above caselaw, the McCollough court’s analysis of
Smarte Carte’s conduct was insufficient.
The McCollough court, and all subsequent courts analyzing motions to
dismiss BIPA complaints based on a lack of Article III standing, should
analyze through the above framework. Based on the above caselaw,
McCollough’s BIPA allegations should be considered a substantive violation. The structure of the government and principles of federalism give
states the power to legislate where unrestricted by federal legislation. 82 The
Illinois legislature has the ability to create new legal interests for Illinois,
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Bautz v. ARS Nat’l Servs., 226 F. Supp. 3d 131, 148 (E.D. N.Y. 2016).
842 F.3d 181, 189 (2d Cir. 2016).
Id. at 190.
Id.
Id.
15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1968).
See New York v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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just as Congress has the ability to do for the country. 83 As such, considering the Illinois legislature validly enacted BIPA, their judgment should be
deferred to just as one defers to Congress’s judgment in the passage of
federal legislation.
In enacting BIPA, the Illinois legislature sought to protect its residents’ biometric data from abuse.84 While, theoretically, this statute could
be characterized as accomplishing this goal by proscribing how companies
manage data and keep their records, it goes beyond a typical recordkeeping
statute because it also contains provisions that directly affect consumers. In
including provisions that require companies to create a written notice and
gather written consent to collect a consumer’s biometric data, the Illinois
legislature has essentially included what amounts to an informed consent
provision. Informed consent requirements in the medical malpractice context differ from state to state, but certain aspects are analogous to this context. For example, in Delaware, to recover, a plaintiff is required to plead
and prove via preponderance of the evidence that the patient didn’t receive
the customary amount of informed consent.85 In Pennsylvania, a plaintiff is
required to plead and prove that receiving the lacking information would
have been a factor in the decision to undergo surgery. 86
While perhaps not directly analogous, these statutes illustrate that failing to provide information prior to consent can result in civil liability. They
also show that violations of informed consent provisions have a direct effect on the uninformed. While the effect in the medical context may be
more extreme, the effect in this context is nonetheless important. Biometric
data, just like a social security number, runs the risk of identity theft. However, unlike a social security number, it is unable to be changed. For this
reason, knowledge of who has your biometric information, what they are
doing with it, and with whom they are sharing it is essential. Without this
information, consumers expose themselves broadly to irremediable identity
theft. As such, consumers are directly affected by a breach of this nature,
and it is a breach the legislature created the statute to prevent against. As
such, Smarte Carte’s alleged BIPA violations should be deemed substantive violations sufficient to satisfy concreteness.
In the alternative, if a court were to find that McCollough’s BIPA allegations should be classified as a procedural violation, the action should

83.
84.
85.
86.

Morgan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 309 U.S. 78, 80 (1940).
See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 14/5 (2019).
18 DEL. CODE § 6852 (1995).
40 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1303.504 (2002).
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nonetheless satisfy standing because BIPA allegations clearly carry a real
risk of harm.
Though McCollough does not allege that further harm resulted from
Smarte Carte’s alleged BIPA violations, it is logical to infer a real risk of
harm from the plaintiff’s allegations. Justice Alito, in Spokeo, states that
“Robins cannot satisfy the demands of Article III by alleging a bare procedural violation.” 87 McCollough’s allegations amount to more than a bare
procedural violation because the risk of a violation of BIPA is distinguishable from the risks stemming from a violation of the FCRA and are more
analogous to the risks stemming from a violation of the TILA, FDCPA, or
the TCPA. In Spokeo, risks resulting from the alleged violation could be
summed up by dissemination of incorrect identifying information. The
greatest material risk in Spokeo is that a prospective employer believes that
Robins lives in Vernon Hills, Illinois (60061) instead of Chicago, Illinois
(60661). On the other hand, the risks inherent in the statutory violations
alleged in McCollough are far greater. McCollough risks that her biometric
information is disclosed without her consent, permission, or notice. As
stated above, without knowledge of into which hands her biometric information has fallen, McCollough would be unable to protect her information
against identity theft. As a violation of BIPA naturally carries a material
risk of harm, were a violation of BIPA to be considered procedural, it
should still satisfy the concreteness requirement.
That natural difference between BIPA and other statutes is seen in the
type of information protected under BIPA as compared to the FCRA,
which should also be significant for the court to consider in evaluating
concreteness of a violation of BIPA. Under the FCRA, the nature of the
information to be protected is dynamic, meaning it is ever-changing and
evolving as a person moves through her life, and, while collectively, it can
serve in a personally-identifying role, independently, the information is not
personally-identifying. In Spokeo, for example, the information presented
in Robins’s profile included his marital status, his age, his occupation, his
financial status, and his education level. 88 However, the nature of the information BIPA protects is far more private. BIPA protects biometric identifiers and information, which, again, are impossible to change. Once
biometric identifiers or information are compromised, it is entirely impossible to replace. As the nature of the information BIPA seeks to protect is
much more private than that of the FCRA, Spokeo should be considered
87.
88.

Spokeo v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1550 (2016) (emphasis added).
Id. at 1546.

2020]

BIPA

845

instructive only in creation of an analytical framework for determining
which statutory violations satisfy concreteness and not as a directly analogous statutory example.
This result is supported by the court’s holding in Patel v. Facebook,
89
Inc. In Patel, the court utilizes its own framework to analyze the plaintiffs’ Article III standing for their BIPA claims.90 The Facebook court was
faced with analyzing whether Facebook users had Article III standing to
bring a claim under BIPA. 91 Facebook plaintiffs brought their BIPA claims
as a result of Facebook’s “tag suggestion” software, which utilizes biometric technology to create a facial scan of any faces in an any photograph
uploaded to the website when the uploading user has tag suggestions enabled. 92 Facebook then uses the facial recognition software to identify
whether the user’s friends appear in the photograph and offer a proposed
Facebook user to tag in said photograph. 93 Facebook plaintiffs claim that
Facebook violated BIPA by failing to issue a public retention and destruction policy and similarly failing to notify them and obtain their consent
before collection, usage, and storage of their biometric information. 94
The Facebook court conflates the substantive and procedural violation
analysis into its own two-step approach, which asks “(1) whether the statutory provisions at issue were established to protect [the plaintiff’s] concrete
interests . . . and if so, (2) whether the specific procedural violations alleged . . . present a material risk of harm to, such interests.” 95 The court
finds that, not only does the common law support recognizing interests that
protect personal privacy rights, which are intertwined with constitutional
zones of personal privacy protections, but the Illinois legislature was clear
as well in its intent to do the same.96 Further, the defendant’s behavior was
of the exact nature the statute sought to prevent, which the plaintiff explicitly alleges the defendant violated, indeed creating a risk of material harm
to the very interest the Illinois legislature intended to protect.97
While the Facebook court’s Article III standing analysis covers both
aspects of substantive and procedural statutory analysis, the distinction
between procedural and substantive categories remains important, mainly
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

932 F.3d 1264, 1275 (9th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 1270-71.
Id. at 1267.
Id. at 1268.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1270-71.
Id. at 1271-74.
Id. at 1274-75.
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due to the language in Spokeo, which specifically refers to procedural violations. 98 As such, should a plaintiff be able to avoid categorization as a
procedural statutory violation, which as explained supra, a BIPA violation
should, it is theoretically easier for her to establish concreteness and, in
turn, survive a motion to dismiss arguing a lack of Article III standing.
B. BIPA Plaintiffs Likewise Satisfy State Procedural Standing
State courts have seen similar standing arguments made in motions to
dismiss complaints brought alleging BIPA violations. Illinois state courts,
however, have a different standard for standing than Article III standing in
federal courts. 99 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and Article III of the Constitution limits federal jurisdiction by requiring an actual
case or controversy. 100 State courts, however, are courts of original jurisdiction, intended to be open to all justiciable issues.101 In Illinois, “[t]he purpose of the standing doctrine is to ensure that courts are deciding actual,
specific controversies and not abstract ones.” 102 As a result, standing doctrine in Illinois differs significantly from Article III standing. 103 A notable
difference between the two is that standing in Illinois tends to give greater
liberality to plaintiffs.104 Illinois courts have described standing to require
“only some injury in fact to a legally cognizable interest.” 105
Further, while federal courts require the plaintiff to plead standing, Illinois state courts do not place a burden on the plaintiff to plead and prove
the same.106 Instead, standing in Illinois is an affirmative defense asserted
by the defendant, who is required to plead and prove a lack of standing,
rather than by the plaintiff as a threshold bar to subject-matter jurisdiction. 107
Considering Illinois’s state courts have a more liberal application of
the standing doctrine, it is far more likely that an Illinois court would find
for procedural standing in a BIPA case. Even a “technical violation” of the
98. Spokeo v. Robins, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016).
99. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60; Greer v. Illinois Housing Dev.
Authority, 122 Ill. 2d 462, 491, 524 N.E.2d 561, 574 (1988); ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 9.
100. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
101. Greer, 122 Ill. 2d at 491.
102. Maschek v. City of Chicago, 2015 IL App (1st) 150520, ¶ 84, 46 N.E.3d 843, 858 (citing In
re M.I., 2013 IL 113776, ¶ 32, 989 N.E.2d 173).
103. See In re Estate of Burgeson, 125 Ill. 2d 477, 484-85, 532 N.E.2d 825, 828 (1988).
104. See Greer, 122 Ill. 2d at 491.
105. Id. at 492.
106. Chicago Teachers Union, Local 1 v. Board of Educ. of Chicago, 189 Ill. 2d 200, 206, 724
N.E.2d 914, 918 (2000).
107. Greer, 122 Ill. 2d at 494.
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statute, one in which the allegation of injury is derived from defendant’s
breach of the statutory language without further facts alleging resulting
harm, could be fairly classified as an injury in fact to a legally cognizable
interest.
A technical violation would satisfy Illinois standing because it is distinct and palpable, fairly traceable to defendant’s actions, and redressable.
Illinois standing does not contain the same rigor of concreteness and particularity requirements within injury-in-fact, which are the source of much
of Article III standing jurisprudence. 108 As such, BIPA plaintiffs should be
able to easily satisfy Illinois’s injury-in-fact requirement, and, in turn, Illinois standing.
C. Resolving Statutory Standing (“Person Aggrieved”) in Favor of
Plaintiffs
In order to maintain an action under BIPA, a plaintiff must satisfy not
only procedural standing in the form of either Article III standing or Illinois’s standing doctrine, but a plaintiff must also satisfy “statutory standing,” which is an inquiry separate and distinct from procedural standing.
That is, the plaintiff must fall within the category of individuals given a
private right of action by the statute. Under BIPA, this group of individuals
consists of “[a]ny person[s] aggrieved by a violation of this Act.” 109 Interpretation of this language was overwhelmingly litigated in past years,
though recently resolved by the Illinois Supreme Court in Rosenbach v. Six
Flags Entertainment Corporation. 110
Beginning in 2015 and the years following, multiple class action lawsuits were brought based on violations of BIPA, requesting relief in the
form of statutory damages.111 In January 2016, one such class action lawsuit was brought by Stacy Rosenbach, alleging a violation of her son’s
rights under BIPA when an amusement park, Six Flags Great America
(“Six Flags”), collected her son’s fingerprint while registering him for a
season pass to the park.112 Rosenbach alleged that Six Flags did not give
her son any literature that specified the purpose, length of term for which
her son’s fingerprint would be collected, stored, and used, nor did Rosen108. Id. at 492-93.
109. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/20 (2008).
110. Rosenbach v. Six Flags Ent. Corp., 2019 IL 123186, ¶ 40, 129 N.E.3d 1197, 1207.
111. Rottner v. Palm Beach Tan, No. 15-CH-16695, 2016 WL 11397938, at *1 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 2016);
see Grabowska v. Millard Maintenance Co., No. 17-CH-13730, 2017 WL 4767159 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 2017);
Rapai v. Hyatt Corp., No. 17-CH-14483, 2017 WL 5015841 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 2017); Howe v. Speedway,
LLC, No. 17-CH-11992, 2017 WL 4019942 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 2017).
112. Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 2017 IL App (2d) 170317, ¶ 7.
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bach or her son sign a written release. 113 Rosenbach requested relief in the
form of statutory damages, alleging that, while she and her son did not
suffer additional harm, she would not have purchased a season pass for her
son had she known of Six Flags’ conduct.114
Six Flags brought a motion to dismiss Rosenbach’s complaint, arguing
that a person who suffers no additional harm is not “aggrieved” under
BIPA and thus cannot sustain an action under the statute. 115 The trial court
denied Six Flags’ motion to dismiss, but certified two questions under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308 for appellate review. 116 The two questions
for review were:
[W]hether an individual is an aggrieved person under section 20 of the
Act and may seek statutory liquidated damages authorized under section
20(1) of the Act . . . when the only injury he or she alleges is a violation of
section 15(b) of the Act by a private entity that collected his or her biometric identifiers and/or biometric information without providing him or
her the disclosures and obtaining the written consent required by section
15(b) or the Act and
[W]hether an individual is an aggrieved person under section 20 of the
Act and may seek injunctive relief authorized under section 20(4) of the
Act . . . when the only injury he or she alleges is a violation of section
15(b) of the act by a private entity that collected his or her biometric
identifiers and/or biometric information without providing him or her the
disclosures and obtaining the written consent required by section 15(b)
of the Act. 117

On appellate review, Six Flags again argued that the interpretation of
person “aggrieved” under the statute that is most consistent with BIPA’s
language and purpose and with other interpretations of the term in other
statutes and in other jurisdictions requires actual harm or adverse consequences to fall within the intended coverage of the statute.118 Rosenbach
argued that a technical violation of BIPA was sufficient to render a party
“aggrieved.” 119
The appellate court agreed with Six Flags, relying on a legal dictionary definition of “aggrieved,” authority from lower courts, and general
rules of statutory construction in holding that “a plaintiff who alleges only
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at ¶ 8.
Id. at ¶ 10.
Id. at ¶ 1.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 15 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at ¶ 18.
Id.
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a technical violation of the statute without alleging some injury or adverse
effect is not an aggrieved person under section 20 of the Act.” 120 The court
concludes that Rosenbach’s allegations of violations of the notice and consent provisions of BIPA are technical violations and, thus, they do not
equate to alleging an adverse effect or harm.121 As such, the court concludes that, to maintain a cause of action under BIPA, Rosenbach would
need to allege an “actual injury, adverse effect, or harm in order for the
person to be ‘aggrieved.’” 122
The Illinois Supreme Court, reviewing the issue de novo, 123 reversed
the appellate court ruling and found that “an individual need not allege
some actual injury or adverse effect, beyond violation of his or her rights
under the Act, in order to qualify as an ‘aggrieved’ person” and maintain
statutory standing under BIPA. 124 The court relies heavily on tools of general statutory construction in its analysis, comparing section 14/20 to various other Illinois statutes that provide aggrieved individuals a private right
of action, historical case law definitions of the term “aggrieved,” and
standard dictionary definitions of the term “aggrieved.” 125 The court further
justifies its analysis by citing to the legislature’s intent, characterizing the
express language of the legislature in granting a private right of action to
any individual who suffers a violation of the statute as “unambiguous.” 126
The Illinois Supreme Court additionally addresses one aspect of the
appellate court opinion it found to be particularly egregious—the Appellate
Court’s de facto categorization of Rosenbach’s allegation as a mere “technical violation.” 127 While the Illinois Supreme Court agrees this is an improper categorization, the Court continues on to discuss the benefits of the
so-called “procedural protections” afforded by the statute.128 By classifying
BIPA plainly as a procedural statute, the Court misses an opportunity to
analyze the statute differently and, in a way, does harm to the strength of
the statute.
While statutory standing is a distinct inquiry from Article III standing,
the categorization of substantive and procedural violations can be instructive in analyzing statutory standing as well. Where the appellate court relies
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at ¶¶ 20-23.
Id. at ¶ 21.
Id. at ¶ 20.
Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 2019 IL 123186, ¶ 18, 129 N.E.3d 1197, 1202.
Id. at ¶ 40.
Id. at ¶¶ 27, 30-32.
Id. at ¶¶ 35-38.
Id. at ¶ 34.
Id.
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so heavily on the language “mere technical violation,” the type of statute
should be considered. It is feasible to liken the term “technical violation” to
the procedural violation analysis of Article III. The use of the term “mere
technical violation” leads to an appropriate inference that the appellate
court considered a violation of BIPA’s notice and consent provision to be a
breach in statutorily-mandated procedure, rather than as a breach of a substantive right conferred by the statute. 129 By continuing the rhetoric that
BIPA is procedural, the Illinois Supreme Court misses an opportunity for
stronger analysis.
As discussed in section 1A, supra, a violation of the notice and consent provision in BIPA should be classified as a substantive violation, as it
is a violation of conduct that the legislature specifically intended to remedy
by creation of this statute and has a direct effect on consumers. Six Flags’
conduct in neglecting to circulate information regarding the collection,
storage, use, or retention of a child’s biometric data and in neglecting to
obtain written consent prior to that collection, storage, use, and retention of
a child’s biometric data violates what the legislature intended to protect
against in enacting BIPA, which is an idea expressed by the Illinois Supreme Court. 130
Again, while the term “substantive violation” is a part of Article III
standing jurisprudence, it is instructive here. The appellate court held that a
plaintiff need only “allege some injury” in order to maintain statutory
standing. 131 If a substantive statutory violation is enough to be regarded as
de facto concrete injury for Article III standing purposes, it is logical that a
substantive violation for Article III purposes inherently alleges some injury.
This substantive violation analysis would take the Court’s holding one step
further, and the Court may have benefitted from grounding its opinion outside of statutory construction. Analysis requiring classification of the statutes as substantive or procedural in nature is a less malleable way to
interpret that statute. The more malleable a holding, the more room it
leaves parties to interpret and litigate an issue already decided.
D. Current Issues in BIPA Litigation
While Rosenbach may have answered one question plaguing BIPA litigation, dozens remain unanswered. 132 Pre-Rosenbach litigation mainly
129. See Rosenbach v. Six Flag Entm’t Corp., 2017 IL App (2d) 170317, ¶¶ 21-23.
130. See Rosenbach, 2019 IL 123186, ¶ 34, 129 N.E.3d 1197, 1206.
131. Rosenbach, 2017 IL App (2d) 170317, ¶ 23.
132. See Def. Mem. in Support of Mot. to Dismiss, Rogers v. CSX Intermodal Terminals, Inc., No.
1:19-cv-2937, 2019 WL 4254057 (N.D. Ill. June 7, 2019); Def. Kronos, Inc. Mem. in Support of Mot.
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concerned the “aggrieved” question, but rulings from the pre-Rosenbach
era may be instructive in evaluating questions raised post-Rosenbach. One
such issue raised by many defendants is the question of voluntariness and
its effect on BIPA’s consent requirements. 133 Some defendants argue in
motions to dismiss and assert as an affirmative defense that plaintiffs voluntarily provided their fingerprints and other biometric data to defendants. 134 By voluntarily providing their biometric data to defendants,
defendants contend that plaintiffs consented to the collection of their data. 135
Pre-Rosenbach injury analysis may prove instructive in evaluating
current BIPA disputes. For example, Rottner v. Palm Beach Tan, brought
in 2015 in front of the Cook County Chancery Division, saw the plaintiff,
Rottner, allege a violation of BIPA when the defendant, a tanning salon
chain, Palm Beach Tan, enrolled Rottner in its national membership database using her fingerprint. 136 Rottner alleged that Palm Beach Tan did not
provide its customers with information about collection of their biometric
data, obtain a written release prior to collection of fingerprints, nor provide
publicly available policy identifying its retention schedule and guidelines
for destruction of data. 137
Palm Beach Tan subsequently moved to dismiss the complaint with
prejudice. 138 Initially, the court denied Palm Beach Tan’s motion on the
grounds that Rottner’s allegation of a violation of BIPA’s notice and consent provision made her a “person aggrieved” under the statute, and, thus,
she could sustain a cause of action. 139 However, following the appellatelevel Rosenbach decision, the court granted Palm Beach Tan’s motion to
reconsider. 140 Dismissing the complaint, the court held that Rosenbach was
to Dismiss, Crooms v. Southwest Airlines Co., No. 1:19-cv-02149, 2019 WL 3369501 (N.D. Ill. May 3,
2019); Def. Mem. in Support of Mot. to Dismiss, Lydon v. Fillmore Hospitality, No. 1:19-cv-03989
(N.D. Ill. July 19, 2019).
133. See Def.’s First Am. Answer, Howe v. Speedway, LLC, No. 1:19-cv-01374 (N.D. Ill. May
29, 2019); Def. NFI’s Answer, Defendant NFI Indus. Inc.’s Answer and Defenses to Plaintiff’s Proposed Amended Class Action Complaint at 37, Stidwell v. Kronos, Inc., No. 1:19-cv-00770 (N.D. Ill.
Feb 13, 2019); Def.’s Answer and Affirmative Defenses at 42-43, Young v. Worldwide Technology,
LLC, 3:19-cv-00496-SMY-GCS (S.D. Ill. June 29, 2019).
134. See Def. Mem. in Support of Mot. to Dismiss, Morris v. Wow Bao, No. 2017-CH-12029 (Ill.
Cir. Ct. Cook Cty. June 7, 2019).
135. See id.
136. Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 1, 2, 26-29, Rottner v. Palm Beach Tan,
Inc., No. 15-CH-16695 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook Cty., Nov. 13, 2015).
137. Id. at 21-22.
138. Order Granting Motion to Reconsider and Dismissing Complaint with Prejudice, Rottner v.
Palm Beach Tan, No. 15-CH-16695, 2016 WL 11397938, at *1 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook Cty., Mar. 2, 2016).
139. Id.
140. Id.
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binding upon the court and required that the court dismiss Rottner’s complaint based on an allegation of a technical violation of the statute. 141
Rottner asserted that her complaint alleges more than a statutory violation, going as far as arguing that she suffered pecuniary damages and an
injury to a privacy right. 142 The court disagreed with Rottner’s contention. 143 It found that, because Rottner voluntarily submitted to the fingerprint scan, and there was no publication of Rottner’s fingerprint
information, she did not suffer an injury to a privacy right.144
While Rottner’s explicit holding—that the plaintiff did not suffer an
injury sufficient to confer statutory standing—is no longer good law, the
reasoning could have implications for arguments concerning voluntariness. 145 A defendant could conceivably use the language of Rottner to argue that, while a plaintiff may have suffered an injury sufficient to confer
statutory standing, she should not ultimately prevail on her claim because
she submitted her fingerprint voluntarily and should not recover under the
statute. The persuasiveness of this argument, however, is doubtful.
BIPA requires written consent for the collection of biometric data. 146
An employee who places her finger on a scanner to clock in or a customer
who chooses to use facial recognition technology while she places her order does not give written consent by these actions alone. Accordingly, an
employer or company who relies on her selection of biometric technology
as her only consent does not satisfy the requirement of written consent.
Even where BIPA does not require written consent, the argument is unpersuasive. BIPA can be likened to an informed consent statute. Violation of a
privacy right, even where voluntarily submitted, is actionable in other contexts. For example, in the context of surgery, a patient has the right to informed consent. 147 Even though the patient voluntarily submits herself to
surgery, she has the right to sue for lack of informed consent should the
doctor have not told the patient a critical piece of information in advance of
the surgery, even without additional negligence on the behalf of the doctor. 148 Thus, while that employee or customer may have chosen to utilize
141. Id. at *2.
142. See id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(b)(3) (2008).
147. See Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 271 (1990).
148. See Hannemann v. Boyson, 282 Wis. 2d 664, 703 (2005) (finding a chiropractor’s duty to
obtain informed consent is equal to that of a medical doctor and does not require resulting negligent
treatment for a finding of liability); Andersen v. Khanna, 913 N.W.2d 526, 546 (2018) (finding “the
plaintiff’s ‘injury’ from the physician’s failure to obtain informed consent does not have to be physical
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biometric technology, she does not know by mere virtue of this choice that
her biometric data is being collected and stored. She should have access to
that information prior to submitting her biometric data, and, under BIPA, it
is the collecting entity’s responsibility to provide it. 149
Dixon v. Washington & Jane Smith Community—Beverly, another preRosenbach decision, supports this analysis. In Dixon, the plaintiff, Cynthia
Dixon, brought a class action suit against her former employer, Smith Senior Living (“Smith”) and its timekeeping vendor, Kronos, Inc. (“Kronos”),
alleging violations of BIPA. 150 The court, denying a 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss, found that BIPA establishes Dixon’s right to privacy in her biometric information.151 The court held that “obtaining or disclosing a person’s biometric data without her consent or knowledge necessarily
infringes on the right to privacy in that data.” 152 The court ultimately found
that, though this harm is not tangible or pecuniary, it is an actual and concrete harm that stems from the defendants’ alleged BIPA violations. 153 As
such, the harm, dissemination of Dixon’s information to a third-party vendor and the consequential privacy right violation, is sufficient to support
Dixon’s claim under BIPA. 154
Following Dixon, in Sekura v. Krishna Schaumburg Tan, Inc., the
First District of the Illinois Appellate Court found that Sekura, where she
freely gave her fingerprint to enroll in an L.A. Tan database, had a privacy
right in her fingerprint data. 155 Dissemination of that data to a third-party
without her knowledge or consent would amount to a violation of that privacy right, regardless of whether or not she freely gave her fingerprint. 156
Again, while Dixon and Sekura do not explicitly evaluate the consent
and voluntariness argument, they may prove persuasive to future courts
evaluating this issue, as their holdings have many legal implications. Both
are notable in that the courts take an expansive view of BIPA. While the
statute explicitly provides that consent must be in writing for collection and
storage of data, it does not mandate the same written requirement for consent for disclosure of biometric data. 157 Thus, BIPA’s disclosure consent
or a result of the materialization of the undisclosed risk” and that informed consent is a separate method
of imposing liability from negligence and allows for recovery when treatment was not negligent).
149. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(b)(1).
150. No. 17 C 8033, 2018 WL 2445292, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 31, 2018).
151. Id. at *12.
152. Id. at *11.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. 2018 IL App (1st) 180175, ¶ 77, 115 N.E.3d 1080, 1096.
156. Id. at ¶¶ 76-77.
157. Compare 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(b) (2008) with 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(d) (2008).
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mandate is arguably more susceptible to the voluntariness argument, as it is
more reasonable to contend that voluntary use is akin to acknowledgement
of the risks inherent in using biometric technology and implicit consent to
those risks. As the statute does not require explicit consent for disclosure, it
is feasible that a court could find voluntary use of biometric technology
equates to consent to disclosure of biometric data.158
However, the Dixon court treats collection and disclosure equally,
finding that Dixon’s allegations that the defendant obtained or disclosed
her biometric data without knowledge or consent was an injury sufficient to
confer statutory standing. 159 In Dixon, the plaintiff used her fingerprint to
clock in and out of work. 160 While clocking in and out of work was a requirement of her job, she used her fingerprint freely. 161 The same is true of
the plaintiff in Sekura, where the court held the same. 162 Despite this, the
court still found that her allegation of dissemination without consent was
adequate to maintain a cause of action.163 While Dixon and Sekura do not
answer the voluntariness question outright, they certainly imply that voluntary use of biometric technology is not sufficient to procure consent for
either collection and storage under Section 15(b) or dissemination under
Section 15(d). Both courts find that, despite voluntarily offering their fingerprint data, both are able to maintain a cause of action based on a violation of a privacy right.
A variety of other interpretation issues are currently plaguing the
court, largely involving interpretation of BIPA’s statutory language. 164 As
explained supra, BIPA applies to biometric identifiers or information.
Some defendants argue that technology, like timeclocks, that utilize hand
geometry or fingerprint scans as a method for authentication, do not actually fit under the definition of biometric data, as any scans are converted into

158. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(d).
159. Dixon, No. 17 C 8033, 2018 WL 2445292, at *10.
160. Id. at *1.
161. Id. at *10.
162. Sekura v. Krishna Schaumburg Tan, 2018 IL App (1st) 180175, ¶¶ 8, 77, 115 N.E.3d 1080,
1084, 1096.
163. Id.
164. See Def. Mem. in Support of Mot. to Dismiss, Bruhn v. New Albertson’s, Inc., No. 2018-CH01737 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook Cty., Aug. 20, 2019) (arguing against constitutionality of BIPA); Def.’s Mem.
in Support of Mot. to Dismiss, Mosby v. Ingalls Memorial Hosp., No. 2018-CH-05031 (Ill. Cir. Ct.
Cook Cty., June 5, 2019) (arguing for dismissal under a HIPAA exception under BIPA); Def.’s Mem. in
Support of Mot. to Dismiss, Diaz v. Silver Cross Hosp., No. 2018-CH-001327 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Will Cty.,
June 3, 2019) (arguing for dismissal under a BIPA HIPAA exception); Def. Mem. in Support of Mot. to
Dismiss, Heard v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., No. 1:19-cv-04158 (N.D. Ill. July 31, 2019) (arguing for
dismissal under a BIPA HIPAA exception); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/10 (2008).
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and stored as data points. 165 Section 10 also provides for exceptions to
compliance with the statute.166 Certain exceptions include “information
captured from a patient in a health care setting or information collected,
used, or stored for health care treatment, payment, or operations under the
federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996.” 167
Government actors are similarly dispensed of complying with BIPA’s requirements. 168 These exceptions have created their own disputes within
BIPA litigation—from assertions that BIPA excepts any entity in the medical field from complying with BIPA, called the “HIPAA-BIPA exception,”
to contentions that BIPA’s exclusion of government actors renders the statute unconstitutional. 169 Some of these arguments, like the “HIPAA-BIPA
exception,” have been ruled on by several courts at the trial level, while
others are still being briefed or are awaiting a ruling. However, with the
high volume of BIPA cases pending in courts across Illinois, these arguments will continue to be raised and briefed in subsequent Motions to Dismiss class action BIPA complaints.
II. INTERPRETING BIPA GOING FORWARD
As technology advances and evolves, the possible uses for biometric
data are increasing along with thieves’ savviness.170 As such, the need to
safeguard biometric data will only increase as time goes on.171 In fact, given the reality that technology will advance, the need to protect biometric
data is pressing, as it is essential to prevent that data from falling into the
165. See Def.’s Mem. in Support of Mot. to Dismiss, Heard v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., No.
1:19-cv-04158 (N.D. Ill. July 31, 2019); Def.’s Mem. in Support of Mot. to Dismiss, Fields v. Abra
Auto Body & Glass, LP, No. 2017-CH-12271 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook Cty., Feb. 22, 2019).
166. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/10.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See Def. Mem. in Support of Mot. to Dismiss, Bruhn v. New Albertson’s, Inc., No. 2018-CH01737 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook Cty., Aug. 20, 2019) (arguing against constitutionality of BIPA); Def.’s Mem.
in Support of Mot. to Dismiss, Mosby v. Ingalls Memorial Hosp., No. 2018-CH-05031 (Ill. Cir. Ct.
Cook Cty., June 5, 2019) (arguing for dismissal under a HIPAA exception under BIPA); Def.’s Mem. in
Support of Mot. to Dismiss, Diaz v. Silver Cross Hosp., No. 2018-CH-001327 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Will Cty.,
June 3, 2019) (arguing for dismissal under a BIPA HIPAA exception); Def. Mem. in Support of Mot. to
Dismiss, Heard v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., No. 1:19-cv-04158 (N.D. Ill. July 31, 2019) (arguing for
dismissal under a BIPA HIPAA exception); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/10.
170. See Jon Porter, Huge Security Flaw Exposes Biometric Data of More than a Million Users,
THE VERGE (Aug. 14, 2019, 6:58 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/14/20805194/supremabiostar-2-security-system-hack-breach-biometric-info-personal-data
[https://perma.cc/ULD4-DPTE];
Jayshree Pandya, Hacking Our Identity: The Emerging Threats from Biometric Technology, FORBES
(Mar. 9, 2019, 12:26 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/cognitiveworld/2019/03/09/hacking-ouridentity-the-emerging-threats-from-biometric-technology/#4eeee7b65682
[https://perma.cc/77S6W2TA].
171. Pandya, supra note 170.
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wrong hands now. The importance of protecting that information immediately is discussed within the text of BIPA itself. 172 Biometric data is seemingly the future of transaction. 173 The legislature recognizes that it has an
interest in promoting uses of information that will benefit society, but it
also recognizes the fact that, given that each identifier is unique, theft
leaves an individual without recourse.174 Thus, the legislature enacted
BIPA to quell any public fears about biometric data theft and promote participation in biometric technology that makes Illinois more efficient.175
Recognition of the desire to protect biometric data is reflected in broad
interpretation of BIPA’s statutory provisions in judicial opinions, such as
Dixon and Sekura. These opinions allow for broad application of the private right of action to individuals affected by violations of BIPA and leave
room for broad ultimate findings of liability resulting from BIPA violations. Expansive application of this section gives effect to the legislature’s
intent to incentivize and require companies to safeguard consumers’ biometric data. In these recent opinions, judges interpret BIPA broadly as
compared to the damaging, narrow construction used in cases like Rosenbach, Rottner, and McCollough. 176 These interpretations, on the other hand,
are damaging to the purpose of the statute, as they allow for companies to
escape liability for failing to safeguard biometric data. While recent interpretations lean towards a broad application, likely in recognition of the
importance of protecting biometric information, in order to properly safeguard biometric information from future identity theft, courts should continue to evaluate legislative intent carefully within the context of statutory
interpretation.
As Rosenbach, Rottner, and McCollough clearly illustrate, there are
opposing judicial interpretations of the statute. Even though Rosenbach
ultimately resolved the issue of statutory standing, many disputes surrounding this statute remain unresolved, and Rosenbach may leave room for
alternative interpretation by district courts.177 With portions left open to
judicial interpretation, the possibility for inconsistent and incorrect applica172. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5 (a)-(g).
173. Id. at (a)-(b).
174. Id. at (c).
175. Id. at (d)-(g).
176. See Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 2017 IL App (2d) 170317, at ¶ 28; Order Granting
Mot. to Reconsider and Dismissing Complaint with Prejudice, Rottner v. Palm Beach Tan, No. 15-CH16695, 2016 WL 11397938, at *2 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook Cty., Mar. 2, 2016); McCollough v. Smarte Carte,
No. 16 C 03777, 2016 WL 4077108, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 2016).
177. See Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 2019 IL 123186, at ¶¶ 12-13, 129 N.E.3d 1197,
1201-02; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Norms, Empiricism, and Canons in Statutory Interpretation, 66 U.
CHI. L. REV. 671, 673 (1999).
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tion remains a realistic threat. Inconsistent and incorrect application is a
problem for accomplishment of BIPA’s legislative purpose, as it hinders
accomplishing the goal of safeguarding biometric data by disincentivizing
companies from following BIPA’s statutory provisions and leaves biometric data vulnerable.
BIPA’s clear lesson is that courts must tread carefully when faced
with the heavy task of interpreting a statute that has not been consistently
drafted by the legislature. BIPA’s own language shows that the statute was
not consistently drafted, but it does contain a straight-forward statement of
legislative intent. 178 While Illinois is currently the only state with biometric
information privacy laws that grant a private right of action, other states,
such as Texas and Washington, have enacted strict biometric data privacy
laws that similarly restrict companies’ ability to collect and store biometric
data without consent and notice.179 Texas’s and Washington’s statutes allow for enforcement of their biometric privacy statutes by their attorney
generals only. The language in both statutes, however, is far clearer as to
what constitutes a violation sufficient to maintain a cause of action. Washington’s statute provides, “a violation of this chapter is not reasonable in
relation to the development and preservation of business and is an unfair or
deceptive act in trade or commerce and an unfair of method of competition
for the purpose of applying the consumer protection act.” 180 Texas’s statute
simply provides, “a person who violates this section is subject to a civil
penalty of not more than $25,000 for each violation.” 181 While, again, these
statutes do not recognize a private right of action, they make clear what
constitutes an actionable violation of the statute without qualification. Other states have proposed biometric privacy laws that not only include a private right of action, but also omit the heavily litigated “persons aggrieved”
language in BIPA. Alaska, for example, provides a private right of actions
to “an individual . . . against a person who intentionally violates [the statute],” expressly defining “person” and “intentionally.” 182
The current legislative formulation of Illinois’s BIPA leaves open
much to interpretation by its statutory language, which will likely continue
to lead to conflicting interpretation and inconsistent application. Careless
judicial treatment of statutory interpretation will be detrimental to the legis178.
179.
(2017).
180.
181.
182.

See generally 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5 (2008).
TEX. BUS & COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001(b) (2017); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.020(1)
WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.030(1) (emphasis added).
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001(d).
H.B. 72, 30th Leg., 1st Sess., (Alaska 2017).
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lative purpose of the statute. Where the legislative purpose is explicit, like
in section 5 of BIPA, the court should interpret the statute broadly in favor
of that purpose going forward. 183
CONCLUSION
In sum, BIPA’s current statutory formulation leaves much room for
incorrect interpretation of a statute with clear intentions. Courts should
continue the trend of broad interpretations of BIPA’s requirements, as that
will lead to accomplishment of legislative intent.

183.

Wittman v. Koenig, 831 F.3d 416, 424 (7th Cir. 2016).

